Monday, November 16, 2026

The Default America Forgot, and the Statute That Erased the Remedy

  From Staff

In 1935 the Supreme Court said Washington could not repudiate its own bonds. Then Congress withdrew the right to sue.

On February 18, 1935, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes announced that the United States government had broken its word and that no one would pay for it.

Hughes wrote for a 5 to 4 majority in Perry v. United States that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority when it canceled the gold payment promise printed on the government's own bonds. The obligation was binding, he wrote. "The binding quality of the promise of the United States is of the essence of the credit which is so pledged."

Then the Court took it back. Perry, Hughes concluded, had shown no loss that a court could measure. The government had tendered 10,000 in currency. He had demanded 10,000 in currency. He had demanded16,931.25. The difference, the Court said, would be "not a recoupment of loss in any proper sense, but an unjustified enrichment."

Perry collected nothing beyond face value. He could not even obtain a symbolic dollar, because the Court of Claims had no authority to award nominal damages.

Five months later, Congress made certain that no other bondholder could try.

The Fourth Liberty Loan opened for subscription on September 28, 1918, to finance the American war effort in Europe. The bond carried a 4.25 percent coupon, ran for 20 years, and could be called beginning in October 1933. The government offered 6 billion and sold 6 billion and sold 7 billion.

Printed on each certificate was a sentence that would eventually cost the country its reputation for never defaulting: "The principal and interest hereof are payable in United States gold coin of the present standard of value."

At the time, a dollar was defined as 25.8 grains of gold at 90 percent fineness, equivalent to approximately $20.67 per troy ounce. The gold clause was not mere legal decoration. It established the monetary value of a dollar for the life of the contract, protecting creditors against the possibility that a future Congress might repay their obligations in a devalued currency or a lighter coin.

Clauses of this kind were incorporated into railroad bonds, utility bonds, municipal debt, corporate obligations and mortgages throughout the country. By 1933, the total value of outstanding obligations containing gold clauses was estimated to be somewhere between $75 billion and $100 billion.

The Depression brought bank runs, hoarding and a collapse in prices. In March 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt closed the banks. On April 5, he signed Executive Order 6102, ordering most privately held monetary gold surrendered to the government by May 1, with penalties of up to $10,000 and 10 years in prison for refusal. On April 20, he suspended gold convertibility.

On June 5, Congress passed a joint resolution declaring gold clauses "against public policy" and providing that debts containing them could be discharged dollar for dollar in ordinary currency.

On January 30, 1934, the Gold Reserve Act vested all monetary gold, including the Federal Reserve's, in the Treasury. The next day, Roosevelt set the price of gold at 35 per ounce, up from 20.67. The price of gold rose 69 percent. The gold content of the dollar fell 41 percent.

A bondholder who was owed $10,000 in 1918 gold was, under the gold clause, entitled to the equivalent of $16,931.25 in the new currency. The Treasury, however, paid only $10,000.

The revaluation handed the government a paper gain of roughly $2.8 billion. Two billion of it was placed in the Exchange Stabilization Fund, an account controlled by the Treasury outside the normal appropriations process. It still exists.

The Supreme Court decided three consolidated disputes on the same day, all by 5 to 4, all written by Hughes, all favoring the government.

In Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the Court held that Congress could void gold clauses in private contracts under its power to coin money and regulate its value. Requiring debtors to pay $1.69 on the dollar, Hughes wrote, would cause "dislocation of the domestic economy."

In Nortz v. United States, a holder of $106,300 in gold certificates who had been paid in paper currency was told he had suffered only nominal damage.

In Perry, the Court reached the question that mattered. A government bond is a contract, Hughes held, and Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids Congress from questioning the validity of the public debt. The joint resolution, as applied to Perry's bond, "went beyond the congressional power."

Justice James McReynolds, joined by Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland and Butler, read his dissent aloud from the bench. "This is Nero at his worst," he said. "The Constitution is gone."

In the written opinion he was more precise: "The Government may give with one hand and take away with the other. Default is thus made both easy and safe."

On June 27, 1935, Roosevelt asked Congress to end the uncertainty. His message was blunt.

"I urge the withdrawal by the United States of its consent to be sued upon its currency or securities," he wrote. "There is no constitutional or inherent right to sue the Government. The immunity of the sovereign from suit is a principle of universal acceptance, and permission to bring such suits is an act of grace, which, with us, may be granted or withheld by the Congress."

Congress complied on August 27, 1935. Public Resolution No. 63 authorized payment of the stated dollar amount to any holder who asked, or exchange into securities without gold clauses at the same rate and maturity. It then withdrew consent to be sued on gold clause securities, on coin, on currency, and on any claim arising from the surrender of gold that involved "the effect or validity of any change in the metallic content of the dollar."

The entire class of claims the Court had just validated in principle was extinguished, not by argument, but by closing the door.

The clauses were never restored. Congress repealed the 1933 resolution in 1977, but only for obligations issued after October 27 of that year. Every bond voided in 1933 had long since been settled at the devalued rate.

Economists still argue about the label. Sebastian Edwards of UCLA titled his 2018 Princeton history of the episode American Default and called it an "excusable" one, meaning investors understood the circumstances and did not hold it against the government afterward. Randall Kroszner of Chicago found that corporate bond prices rose on the day of the decision, evidence that relieving the debt burden avoided a wave of bankruptcies. His data also show that Treasury bonds containing the gold clause fell in value while those without it rose.

What is not in dispute is the sequence. The promise was made. The promise was altered after the fact. The Court found the alteration unconstitutional. The creditor recovered nothing. The right to sue was then abolished by statute.

The dollar amount was paid in full. The thing the contract was written to protect was not.

The episode is rarely taught and the reason is not mysterious. It complicates a premise that Treasury markets depend on, which is that the United States has always honored its obligations. It did not honor this one. It paid the number and changed the meaning of the number. When a court said so out loud, it removed the court.

Sources:

Roosevelt's message to Congress, June 27, 1935 https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/message-congress-gold-clauses-government-bonds

Public Resolution No. 63, August 27, 1935 (49 Stat. 938) https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-49/pdf/STATUTE-49-Pg938.pdf

Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) — full opinion text https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/294/330

United States Reports, Volume 294 — McReynolds dissent https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-294/pdf/USREPORTS-294-361.pdf

Perry v. United States — Oyez summary https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/294us330

Gold Clause Cases — Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_Clause_Cases

Outline of the Gold Clause Cases — Angus MacLean, North Carolina Law Review, vol. 15 https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol15/iss3/2

Gold Clause Cases — Encyclopedia of the American Constitution https://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/gold-clause-cases-norman-v-baltimore-ohio-railroad-co-294-us-240-1935-nortz-v-united-states-294-us

Gold Clause Cases — EBSCO Research Starters https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/gold-clause-cases/

Sebastian Edwards, American Default — review by Gary Richardson (Economic History Association) https://eh.net/book_reviews/american-default-the-untold-story-of-fdr-the-supreme-court-and-the-battle-over-gold/

Sebastian Edwards, American Default — review by James Caton (Independent Institute) https://www.independent.org/tir/2019-20-winter/american-default/

Randall Kroszner, "Is It Better to Forgive Than to Receive?" — full paper https://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/10.1.1.72.381.pdf

Kroszner summary — Chicago Booth Review https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/it-better-forgive-receive

Liberty bond — Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty_bond

Martin Armstrong, "When The US Government Defaulted On Its Bonds" https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/world-news/sovereign-debt-crisis/when-the-us-government-defaulted-on-its-bonds/

America Quietly Defaulted on Its Debt in 1933 — So Why Does No One Remember?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tQBzTTSVrM


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The Default America Forgot, and the Statute That Erased the Remedy

  From Staff In 1935 the Supreme Court said Washington could not repudiate its own bonds. Then Congress withdrew the right to sue. On Februa...