The First Amendment specifies that such words are protected; indeed, both parties in the 303 Creative case stipulated that what Lorie Smith, the web designer, was producing was speech.
Compelling speech with which one disagrees is the same as denying or censoring one's speech.
After pages rehearsing the evolution of accommodation laws - irrelevant to 303 Creative - Sotomayor claims that Colorado wishes to regulate Smith's "Conduct," not her speech, even though the state already stipulated that Smith's activities are "Expressive." Early in her dissent, Sotomayor makes it clear: "As I will explain, the law in question targets conduct, not speech, for regulation." Any burdens on speech in this case are, according to the dissent, "Incidental."
Finally, the dissent comes out and says what it really means: Once Ms. Smith offers some speech, Colorado "Would require [her] to create and sell speech, notwithstanding [her] sincere objection to doing so"-and the dissent would force her to comply with that demand.
While 303 Creative offered a clear determination for speech, other wedding-vendor cases, as Gorsuch intimated, are more opaque.
The court has, in recent years, come down on the side of those claiming their speech rights have been abridged, or denied, in similar cases, most particularly the Masterpiece Cakeshop case, in which fashioning a custom cake for a gay wedding was determined sufficiently "Expressive" to command exemption from anti-discrimination laws.
Legal scholars have been quick to offer distinctions as to which trades are expressive and which not, and which wedding vendors would be exempt from anti-discrimination laws and which not, but so far the court has not handed down a broader interpretation of what constitutes expressive "Speech" but instead has confined its rulings in such free-speech cases to the narrowest basis possible.
https://spectator.org/trumps-speech-is-barred-but-303-creative-remains/
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